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Living in The “Veranda of Mecca”




Sebagai basis utama kebangkitan Islam di Malaysia sekaligus 
kubu terpenting Parti al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), Kelantan secara 
populer sering digambarkan sebagai negara bagian yang miskin 
toleransi terhadap  kaum  non-Muslim. Namun, penggambaran ini 
menyesatkan. Isu utama di Kelantan adalah persaingan politik antara 
UMNO (United Malays National Organization, partai yang berkuasa di 
tingkat nasional) dan PAS, daripada perkara Muslim-non-Muslim. Kaum 
non-Muslim, yang diperkirakan berjumlah sekitar 6 persen dari total 
penduduk negara bagian Kelantan yang berjumlah sekitar 1,6 juta jiwa, 
dalam banyak hal menikmati toleransi kehidupan beragama. Artikel 
ini mendiskusikan bagaimana kaum non-Muslim memaknai ‘toleransi 
beragama’ yang mereka nikmati itu. Alih-alih melihatnya sebagai 
sesuatu yang terberi, mereka memandangnya sebagai buah positif 
yang tidak sengaja muncul dari persaingan antara UMNO dan PAS. 
Kendati menjadi minoritas, suara mereka dalam pemilu sangat berarti 
dan bisa menentukan kemenangan satu pihak atas pihak yang lain 
karena persaingan antara UMNO dan PAS itu senantiasa berlangsung 
ketat. Itulah sebabnya guna mengambil hati mereka, baik UMNO 
maupun PAS sama-sama menawarkan jaminan perlindungan kepada 
mereka. Jaminan itulah yang pada gilirannya membentuk preferensi 
politik kaum non-Muslim dalam pemilihan umum. Dengan demikian 
sebagai minoritas mereka tidak harus menjadi yang tertindas atau 
yang menindas, karena suara mereka yang sangat signifikan dalam 
konstelasi politik yang ada. 
Kata kunci: kontestasi politik, toleransi keagamaan, Kelantan, Malaysia.
Introduction
The question of the relation between Muslims (as the majority) and non-
Muslims (as the minorities) has been increasingly crucial since the event of 
September 11 happened. It is curious how both parties live together in the 
1 Special thanks are due to my academic counterparts, A/P Sumit K. Mandal and A/P Norani 
Othman. Both are staff members of my host institution, the Institute of Malaysian and Inter-
national Studies (Institut Kajian Malaysia dan Antarabangsa), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
(IKMAS-UKM) during my fellowship in Malaysia (March – September 2007). 
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shared public space. It is such a question that this study is concerned with. 
Taking the case of Kelantan, traditionally called the “Veranda of Mecca” of 
Malaysia due to not only its predominantly Muslim population, but also its 
long historical root and stronghold of Islamist party in Malaysia. This study 
aims at achieving a better understanding of how Muslims as the majority 
deal with the non-Muslim as the minorities, and/or how the latter posit 
themselves in a state obsessed with Islamic law (shari’a) and anything Islamic 
affairs. Kelantan as a locus is then a sort of case to look at how the relation of 
both parties is understood and practiced. This study thus explores various 
aspects of the society to examine the possibilities and limitations of such 
interreligious relation. Consequently, grasping the contexts of the locality is 
of primarily importance.   
By contextualizing the issue, this study does not intend to offer a 
generalized understanding on the nature of Muslims – non-Muslims relation, 
but rather to explore how particular contexts shape the relation of both parties. 
This sort of understanding would enable one to avoid the trap of being either 
easily judgmental or extremely defensive – one condition which could be 
counter-productive to the possibility of enhancing the interreligious dialog 
and harmony in a genuine sense. 
This paper is organized as follows. Firstly, it will discuss the theoretical 
framework on the ‘majority’-‘minority’ relation. This will help not only 
to make sense of, but also to locate the case in question within the broader 
theoretical discussion. Secondly, it will describe a brief historical background 
of Kelantan, the making of PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, All Malaysian Islamic 
Party) and its rivalry with the ruling party of the Federation UMNO (United 
Malays National Organizations), and the contested issue of “Islamic state” 
in Kelantan. These features would present the contexts upon which the non-
Muslims posit themselves. Thirdly, it will feature how the Muslims deal with 
the non-Muslims, and/or how the non-Muslims posit themselves in Kelantan. 
Everyday life experiences as observed and somewhat anecdotal information 
collected during my field research in the state from the late of March to the mid 
of June 2007, will set up this section. The data were gathered from interviews 
with various informants.2 Finally, it will present a closing remark, showing 
how being non-Muslims mean in a state obsessed with ‘Islamic agenda’ but 
witnessing a tight political contestation among the Muslim-based political 
parties. 
Majority-Minority Relation: A Theoretical Framework 
Based on the equilibrium of power relation, three patterns of majority-
2 Since this study does not apply a quantitative method, number of informants does not so 
significantly matter. The aim is not collecting data with a high degree of ‘validity’, but the 
richness of nuances of the gathered information.  
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minority relation can be discerned. First, the situation where the minorities 
are oppressed and persecuted. Second, the situation in which the minority 
in question turns oppressor and proceeds to establish its hegemony over the 
numerically superior but militarily helpless host society. The third pattern, 
where ways are sought and means devised with a view to making it possible 
for minorities and majorities to coexist peacefully and living in conditions of 
mutual respect (‘Abd al-Rahim, 1997: 1).  
These patterns are only a model by which one can conceptualize the 
phenomenon observed. Yet, it is not the aim of this study to test which one 
closely fits the case in concern. These patterns are presented just to show that 
the notion of “minority” does not necessarily signify a group numerically 
smaller in number than the majority group, as majority and minority are 
“primarily socio-political concepts” (Hussain, 1997: 3), and “numbers become 
secondary” (Ansari, 1996: xiii). 
The relation between the majority and the minority should then be 
grasped in the context of power relation rather than in the number as such. 
However, power relation does not necessarily refer to the one between the 
majority and minority. It could happen within the majority group itself, rather 
than between the majority and the minority. Therefore, being a majority does 
not necessarily mean homogenous. One (or even more) aspect of life can 
significantly split the majority group, where it is much more crucial than the 
one(s) making the boundaries between the majority and the minorities. The 
same thing can likely happen to the minority.   
In such a constellation of power relation, being a minority could be 
neither the oppressed nor the oppressor, nor simply coexist peacefully with 
the majority. However, it is not the intent of this study to search for a new 
model. Rather it only offers another way of seeing the majority – minority 
relation, in which the economic term of externality is perhaps the best concept 
to use to grasp the case better.   
By definition externality is an unpriced effect of not a deliberate creation 
but of an unintended by product of some otherwise legitimate activity 
(Mishan, 1981: 133). One is not involved in but affected by what other parties 
do. It may be a benefit or a loss. These external effects are also termed third-
party effects (Pinch, 1985: 80).  In the context of majority – minority relation, 
the externality is negative when the minority becomes the very victim of the 
conflict between the two factions of the majority, for they are blamed for the 
rift, or placed as the mediated target by one or both of the factions. They can 
likely be termed ‘passive losers’. While the externality is positive when the 
minority gets benefit from the rift. The benefit could be in such forms as being 
untouched by the conflict, or being acknowledged since both factions of the 
majority group need their support to win over the other. They can be termed 
as ‘passive winners’.   
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As I would like to feature in another part of this article, the non-Muslim 
minorities in Kelantan are in such a strategic position since the crucial issue is 
a tight political contestation between the two factions of the Muslim majority, 
rather than between the Muslims and the non-Muslims as such. In this case, 
number matters not due to the power the minority likely has, but rather due 
to what the majority expects from them. Hence, the minorities become the 
‘winners’ of the contest they are not involved in. This has made their position 
uniquely different from their counterparts elsewhere in Malaysia.  
Kelantan: Political Rivalry and the Issue of “Islamic State”
Located in the northeastern coast of Malaysian peninsula, Kelantan is a 
distinctive state socially, culturally, and politically since the percentage of its 
Malay population is higher than the rest of the peninsula. As Clive S. Kessler 
(1978: 27) notes, its population in 1970 was 686,266, of whom 92.8 percent were 
Malays.3  This is due to the fact that, unlike in western coast of the peninsula, 
British colonial rulers did not encourage the commercial development or non-
Malay immigration. The agrarian nature of its society, therefore, did not change 
significantly. Neither did the social structure of the Kelantanese society, being 
divided into the privileged elite enjoying a mutually advantageous relation 
to the British and a peasant majority shielded by its superiors from direct 
contact with the modern influences then transforming Malaya (Kessler, 1978: 
31). This ‘class divide’ has shaped the political rift of the two Malay-based 
parties, i.e., UMNO and PAS. 
. Political Contestation between PAS and UMNO 
Since the independence of Malaysia in 1957, Kelantan has been the PAS’s 
stronghold. As Mohammad Agus Yusoff (2006: 102) notes, scholars explaining 
why PAS has been so successful in this state have used religion to account for 
its appeal. The driving force behind PAS’s electoral support was derived from 
the manipulation of religious sentiments among rural and religiously devout 
Malay communities. 
Employing religion for winning the mass support was inseparable from 
the formation of PAS itself. Formerly, it was the religious wing of UMNO. 
Many leaders in UMNO’s bureau of religious affairs were dissatisfied with 
the top party leaders’ policy which they perceived to have given much 
concession to the non-Malays and too cooperative with the British colonial 
rulers. In addition, they were disappointed with the top party leaders’ lack of 
	 According to the National Census of Malaysia in 2000, the population of Kelantan was ap-
proximately 1.5 million, of whom 92.5 percent were Malays, and in terms of religious af-
filiations, 94.5 percent were Muslims. While the national population of Malaysia was ap-
proximately 21.8 million, of whom 65.1 percent were Malays and other ‘bumiputeras’ (‘sons 
of soil’). (The non-Malay ‘bumiputeras’ are the so-called indigenous population of Sarawak 
and Sabah in East Malaysia). While in terms of religious affiliations, 60.4 percent were Mus-
lims. The percentage of both Malays and Muslims has not changed significantly.  
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concern in Islam. Therefore they broke away from UMNO to form the Majlis 
Agama Tertinggi Malaya (Malayan Highest Religious Council) in 1947.4  
A year later, it was transformed into Persatuan Islam Se-Malaya (Pan-
Malayan Islamic Union), representing the convergence of elements wishing 
to establish an Islamic state. Since its inception, UMNO had viewed the 
formation of an Islamic party as a major threat to its popularity within the 
Malay community. Yet, it could not prevent the Islamic radicals within UMNO 
to break away. In 1951 PAS was formed. UMNO then had to incorporate a 
religious program to compete with PAS (Verma, 2002: 32).          
In Kelantan, PAS reached out widely to Malays in kampongs by 
campaigning on an uncompromisingly pro-Malay platform. On the contrary, 
UMNO leaders campaigned on the strength of their political record in 
getting independence from the British and their success in overcoming the 
Communist insurgency. Eventhough UMNO recognized that ordinary Malay 
villagers had been the main source of its strength, they chose not to exploit 
parochial issues to win the popular support. It was more concerned about 
the need to strengthen inter-communal cooperation rather than appealing to 
communal sentiments (Yusoff, 2006: 105-6). 
Obviously that PAS portrayed itself as the advocate of Malays and Islam, 
while UMNO as the promoter of “bangsa” (nation), implying the incorporation 
of the non-Malays. However, as the political articulation of their special 
ethnic interests was persistently reformulated within the Malay community, 
the on-going struggle between the bangsa-minded and the shari’a-minded was 
intense. The former were often accused of following secular, un-Islamic laws; 
the latter were accused of being dogmatic and bigoted (Verma, 2002: 45). In 
short, PAS and UMNO leaders searched for issues to discredit one another 
(Yusoff, 2006: 108). 
In revitalizing the party, PAS leaders stressed that Muslims needed a 
strong Islamic opposition party in order to protect the position of Malays as 
well as of Islam. In kampongs, PAS revived the kafir-mengkafir (infidel) issue 
and warned the ordinary villagers that while voting for UMNO might get 
them development, it might also bring retribution in the world hereafter. 
Such arguments did have their impact. In some remote areas they split local 
communities into two camps: the believers (PAS supporters) and the infidels 
(UMNO followers) (Yusoff, 2006: 131).5 Since then, the relationship between 
4 UMNO itself was founded in 1946. Due to such radical aspirations, these elements of Malay 
nationalist movement were called ‘leftist nationalists’, regardless of their Islamic tone of 
thoughts. See Saat (2007: 230). On a study specifically concerned with UMNO in Kelantan, 
see Kamarudin (2004).  
5 Mohammad Agus Yusoff (2006: 140) even informed that as a consequence of the approach 
of the new PAS leadership, the animosities between PAS and UMNO supporters became 
greatly exacerbated. In many kampongs of heavily Malay populated areas, for instance, two 
suraus  (small mosques for praying only, like chapels for Christians) and kuburs (graveyards) 
were set up, one for UMNO members and another one for those supporting PAS. In his 
personal observation, he even found a divorced couple who ended their marriage after the 
husband, a PAS follower, discovered that the wife’s father was an UMNO supporter.   
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the political contestation and the issue of “Islamic state” has been more 
intense.  
2. Islamic Resurgence and the Issue of “Islamic State” 
Initially the rivalry between UMNO and PAS was indeed the contestation 
between the “secular nationalists” and the “Islamist nationalists”. However, 
such a perspective is no longer simply applicable since UMNO has coopted 
the Islamisation agenda as well. What has happened is then a war of claim 
upon whose Islam is “more truthful”.    
One important point to understand the change of the issue(s) of the 
rivalry is the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia since the late 1970s, partly due to 
the impact of the Revolution of Iran. This has to be understood in relation to a 
changing environment. As already observed, there is a close relation between 
Islam and Malay ethnicity, and between that ethnicity and politico-economic 
situation. Hence, began the Malaysian Islamist quest, helping the ummah 
(Muslim community) to cement its old solidarity (Batumalai, 1996: 56). 
The Islamic resurgence was then a moment when the Malays reasserted 
their cultural membership through a religious identity. In the Malaysian context 
where all Malays are Muslims and Islam is viewed as a Malay institution, calls 
for the promotion of Islam were synonymous with the promotion of Malay 
interests. Islam was used as a suitable vehicle for ‘striving for the Malay 
rights’ to acquire and sustain political legitimacy and to mobilize the masses. 
Being the initiator of playing the “Islam” card, PAS was then in a position to 
claim as the defender of the Islamic faith and the Malay rights, even if UMNO 
coopted (as well as contained) Islamization as a state project (Mohamad, 2001: 
116-17; Verma, 2002:  95).
In late 1980s the contest on ‘who is more Islamic’ was even increasingly 
confrontational as by the time witnessed the transformation and radicalization 
of PAS politics under a new group of leaders like Nik Abdul Aziz Nik 
Mat, Fadzil Mohamed Noor, and Abdul Hadi Awang. PAS became more 
uncompromising as more militant activists, pressured the PAS leadership to 
adopt a purer Islamic stance. For the first time, PAS declared its stand as an 
Islamic party with the objective of creating an Islamic state (Verma, 2002: 107; 
Hilley, 2001: 183). 
On the other side, UMNO’s campaign was intimidating. They promised 
further economic development for Kelantan, with the threat that if PAS were to 
win control of the state government, the state would be discriminated against 
in the distribution of federal development funding. Such tactics appeared to 
have a reverse effect. Many kampong folks who earlier would have supported 
UMNO changed their stands. UMNO was heavily defeated in Kelantan 
(Yusoff, 2006: 160-61). 
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Kelantan was then under the PAS’s rule. It could sustain its victories 
in the subsequent general elections (1994, 1999 and 2004), despite UMNO’s 
attempt to keep delegitimizing PAS’s rule. UMNO’s first striking effort 
to delegitimize PAS was dealing with the issue of “Hudud” laws (Syariah 
Criminal Code Bill)6 as proposed by PAS. Although passed in Kelantan as a 
State Act in 1993, the introduction of hudud laws requires Federal approval to 
become constitutionally enshrined; and that proposal was rejected to legislate 
in the parliament as the Malay community lacked a two-thirds majority 
(Yusoff, 2006: 181-85; Hilley, 2001: 191-92).7 
Even though the PAS’s proposal of hudud laws had failed to legislate, 
UMNO used the issue of hudud to portray PAS as an ultra-conservative Islam 
and Kelantan as the land of ultra-conservative Muslims.8 Yet, it has failed to 
delegitimize the PAS’s rule. Even if in the aftermath of September 11, UMNO 
had blackened PAS as an Islamic party akin to the Taliban and allowed for 
detention without trial of scores of alleged Islamic militants (Mohamad, 2003: 
82), but PAS remains in control of Kelantan.  
Being in control of Kelantan, PAS had an authority to implement its ideas 
on ‘Islamic state’. However, much of what passed was in reality an attempt to 
introduce Islamic modifications to localize practice and culture. For example, 
revenue derived from haram9 sources, such as dog licenses and pig-rearing, are 
separated from the halal10 ones and used for non-Muslims only. Alcohol is not 
banned, but it is strictly for non-Muslims only. Traditional art performances 
are allowed only after their “un-Islamic” elements are sorted out. Muslim 
dress codes are introduced and it is compulsory for Muslim women to wear 
headscarf (tudung). Shortly the Islamization agenda was carried out through 
various forms of civil exchange and adaptation (Hilley, 2001: 188). 
It is under such ‘Islamist’ regime the non-Muslims in Kelantan have been 
experiencing their everyday life. However, as UMNO’s ambition to regain 
Kelantan persists, they have been living under the rivalry between PAS and 
UMNO as well. What has happened to the non-Muslims then? 
6 Among the punishments that the Kelantan government could impose under such a law 
were the amputation of hands for thieves, the administration of one-hundred strokes 
by cane for fornicators, and the stoning to death of adulterers. Because of the severity of 
these punishments, rigid evidentiary provisions relating to the number of witnesses, their 
character and the content of of their statements needed to be met. (Part I, Enakmen Kanun 
Jenayah Syariah [II] 1993, as cited in Yusoff, 2006: 181-82). 
7 The debate on the controversy of hudud law has been well-compiled in Tarmizi Mohd Jam 
(1999).   
8 Such an image is still effective to many people outside Kelantan. A Malay Kelantanese 
informant told  that quite often when he visited other parts of Malaysia, he faced a question: 
“Hi, how could you escape from the ‘hudud’ land?”. He knows that it is not a completely 
serious question. But, it indicates that the UMNO’s propaganda on associating Kelantan 
with “hudud” has been so effective in the minds of most Malaysians (Interview with Mr. 
Wan Manan bin Wan Muda, Kota Bharu, March 26, 2007).   
9 It means strictly prohibited in Islam.  
10 It is the antonym of “haram”.  
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It probably sounds ridiculous to raise a question of the relation between 
the Muslims and the non-Muslims in Kelantan, since the more crucial issue 
has been the rivalry between PAS and UMNO. Not a few scholars (see, for 
example, Embong, 2001: 70; Yusoff, 2006: 152; Bakar, 2001: 66; Khoo, 2006: 
145; Kessler, 1978: 241) have argued that there is ‘no problem’ between the 
Muslims and the non-Muslims in Kelantan. This is based on the fact that 
Kelantan has never witnessed any single violent conflict on religious (or 
ethnic) differences.11 Besides, the non-Muslims (or non-Malays) are able to 
adapt to the local cultures, mainly the Kelantanese dialect.12 
Such argument is not wrong. Yet, what is missing is what the ‘no 
problem’ response means to both the Muslims and non-Muslims. Exploring 
how both Muslims and non-Muslims define this ‘no problem’ response could 
reveal what is likely going on ‘below the surface’. In addition, many parts of 
the popular portrayals about Kelantan should be rectified, as the state has 
witnessed various changes after the 2004 elections, where PAS had only won 
a slight victory over UMNO.13 A proper portrayal will help to understand 
how the non-Muslims posit themselves.      
. Kelantan: Some Recent Socio-Cultural Features 
Associating Kelantan with “hudud” laws to “hudud land” is apparently shaped 
by UMNO’s portrayal of the state. This portrayal is, in fact, ambivalent in effect. 
On one side it has obviously dismayed the image of PAS as the ruling party of 
the state. Even as the discourse of “hudud” has been already associated with 
the notorious Taliban’s regime of Afghanistan in 1990s, one is easily tempted 
to put PAS onto the same table as Taliban. However, unlike Taliban which 
quite often produced horrible news related to the implementation of “hudud’ 
laws, there has never been such news from Kelantan. On the other side, this 
has attracted outsiders and foreign journalists, researchers, travelers, etc. to 
know personally ‘what is really going on’ in Kelantan.14 As one finds that 
11 The racial riot of May 1969 did not affect Kelantan. A number of Kelantanese Malay 
informants whom I interviewed were proud of it. However, as is already known, the riot 
took place in Kuala Lumpur and its suburbs only, not spread to other states of the peninsula. 
Yet, its effects might have been felt nationally.   
12 Abdul Rahman Embong (2001: 69), for instance, emphasizes this adaptability of the local 
Chinese to the Malay environment as an evidence to argue that interethnic and interfaith 
relations in the state ‘have been generally harmonious’.  He explains that this is partly 
because Kelantan Malays do not perceive them as a political or economic threat. While this 
is not undeniable, it has not touched upon how they – the non-Muslims – make sense of the 
‘harmony’ there, and how they posit themselves amidst the Muslim majority.  
13 In the 2004 elections, of 45 and 14 seats for the state council and national parliament 
respectively, PAS gained 24 and 5, while the UMNO-led National Alliance gained 21 and 9. 
See ibid., p. 76. 
14 An executive member of PAS in Kelantan said that UMNO’s negative propaganda of Kelantan 
has made many people – both non-Kelantanese Malaysians and non-Malaysians -- curious 
about what really happens there. When people personally find that ‘nothng happens’ there, 
they would realize that UMNO’s stories about Kelantan are cheating. (Interview with Mr. 
Wan Mahmud, the director of human resources development of PAS, in Kota Bharu, April 
28, 2007). 
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hings are not as bad as one might have heard of, one would likely say that 
Kelantan’s “Hudud” is a sort of propaganda. The issue of “hudud” has been 
employed by UMNO to construct a negative image of PAS, at least as it is 
opined by PAS people.15 
However, the problem for PAS is that UMNO’s use of the issue of “hudud” 
persists, since “hudud” in Kelantan has been “a law in waiting” (Ahmad, 2007: 
226).  Seen from the ‘zero sum game’ politics, UMNO’s attempt to immortalize 
the issue of Kelantan’s “hudud” laws can be understood as a revenge, since 
initially PAS used this issue as a trump card par excellence, “not dissimilar 
to the gambit of either you are with us or against us” (Ahmad, 2007: 219). 
Unsurprisingly that the issue of “hudud” laws has turned to the interest of 
UMNO, but in the purpose of undermining PAS. 
Any foreign observer might have such an impression after living 
in Kelantan for some time. They would find that ‘odd’ stories such as the 
separation of sexes in queues in supermarkets, the arrest of a couple who 
have no marital relationship but showing personal intimacy in public places 
(khalwat), the arrest of Muslim men who do not go to the mosques for the 
Friday prayers, etc., are not completely true. One can find the reason partly by 
referring to the result of the 2004 elections, when PAS won a slight victory over 
UMNO for the state council. It could sustain its rule but it had to compromise 
on many businesses. It indicates that PAS is not only defensive, but also, as 
seen in its ‘relaxing’ policies on “Islamization” agenda in the last three years,16 
desperate in facing the next elections.17   
 Despite its “conservative radicalism” in the sense of ‘revitalizing Islam 
for the apprehension of mundane social experience but under the conditions 
that required doctrinal reinvention’ (Khoo, 2006: 142), PAS cannot reject 
the presence of ‘icons of globalization’ such as shopping malls and fast food 
restaurants. Such public places are even a site where the state government 
15 PAS people seem to have been accustomed to listening to foreign researchers’ amazement 
on the fact that what happen in Kelantan is not as bad as what they have heard before. When 
I told such amazement, a PAS state board member said that ‘almost every foreign scholar 
coming to Kelantan has said the same thing’. What he did not say explicitly was that foreign 
scholars having an interest in Kelantan have now realized that what UMNO tells about 
Kelantan is full of lies. (Interview with Mr. Mohd Amar, Pasir Puteh, Kelantan, April 21, 
2007).  
16 These ‘relaxing’ policies are such as the issueing of licenses to reopen amusement premises 
like snooker houses, karaokes, bowling centres, etc. An informant of PAS member certainly 
denied that this indicates that PAS is worried to be abandoned by its supporters among 
the young people. He said that these ‘relaxing’ policies are based on the PAS’ confidence 
that people have already understood PAS’s platform on ‘Islamic state’. (Interview with Mr. 
Mohd Amar, Pasir Puteh, April 21, 2007). 
17 According to a prominent Malaysian  public intellectual Chandra Muzaffar, seizing power 
through the ballot-box is their primary goal. This is why PAS is prepared to adjust to the 
agendas of its Pakatan Rakyat partners, the DAP and PKR in order to maximize non-
Muslim/non-Malay support in the coming General Election. Its motto is simple: power first; 
dogma afterwards.  See Chandra Muzaffar, “PAS and the Islamic State”, in http://www.
just international.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4564:pas-and-the-
islamic-state&catid=41:press-statements&Itemid=122 (Accessed on  September 17,  2011).
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cannot impose the Islamic religious practices.18  
In spite of some ‘relaxing’ policies on things previously prohibited or 
strictly controlled, the state government in October 2005 declared Kota Bharu 
as “Bandar Raya Islam” (an Islamic City). A number of measures following 
this declaration have been taken such as putting placards on public interests 
referring to the Qur’an or Hadith,19 labeling drugs as the “enemy of Islam”, 
etc. In short, this declaration was aimed at making Kota Bharu look more 
Islamic. Obsession on appearances is more dominant here than searching for 
substantially alternative measures on the Islamization agenda. This is due to 
the fact that the agenda, to many extents, has been taken over by UMNO’s 
idea of “Islam Hadhari” just after the latter took over the control of neighboring 
Terengganu from PAS in 2004.20     
Kelantan after the 2004 elections has been more Islamic, but in its 
appearances rather than in its substances. Perhaps it is ironical that many ‘odd’ 
or ‘horrible’ stories dealing with the Islamic practices have been deteriorating, 
in a time when its appearances are more Islamic. How has such irony shaped 
the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims? How has the ‘no problem’ 
response been understood within such a change by both groups of religious 
communities? 
2. The ‘no problem’ response according to the Muslims
In one of his Friday morning sermons, the Chief Minister of Kelantan Nik 
Abdul Aziz Nik Mat said: 
Unlike in the present time where humankind is categorized into hundreds 
of nation, during the   Prophet Mohammad’s era humankind could be 
classified into three types based on their faith. First were the Muslims; 
18 In “KB Mall” – the only shopping mall in Kota Bharu, started its operation just in early 
2005 – for instance, several times I noticed that during the Friday prayer’s time not a few 
Malay men – who must be Muslims – kept playing bowling in the bowling premise, even 
though there is a notice board next to the ticket booth stating that “Muslim men are strictly 
prohibited to be in the bowling premise on Fridays from 1.00 to 2.00 pm”. This means that, 
at least in this case, the ‘syariah’ or ‘Islamic law’ – if such a prohibition could be considered 
as a part of the ‘syariah’ – does not work (effectively).   
19 A rule on banning littering, for instance, refers to an article in the Hadith  that “Cleanliness 
is a part of faith”. This placard is found everywhere. Placard on promoting “friendliness to 
the visitors” in the context of promoting “Visit Kelantan Year 2008” is opened by a citation 
from the Hadith  saying that “welcoming, greeting and feeding the visitors is a part of 
religious imperative”. There are many more placards on such public interests which I have 
documented in photographs. 
20 Under the control of UMNO with its “Islam Hadhari” slogan, meaning “modern and 
progressive Islam”, everywhere in Terengganu one can easily find posters and billboards 
saying “dulu hanya mimpi kini menjadi realiti” (in the past it was just a dream, now it has 
turned to reality) amidst the picture of various development projects such as new mosques, 
hospitals, school buildings, while at the corner is the picture of the chief minister of the state, 
Dato’ Mohd Idris Yusoh. Such words are clearly aimed at undermining PAS’s rule over 
Terengganu from 1999 to 2004, which is portrayed to dream only (Personal observation in 
Terengganu on April 10-12, 2007).  
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second were the infidels; third were the hypocrites. The infidels were 
indeed the enemies of the Muslims. They had their own space, separate 
from the Muslims. Yet, Muslims did not have to be in hostile to them, if 
they were not in hostile to the Muslims. Even both could co-exist based 
on some mutual agreement and respect. 
Now, the ones whom every Muslim has to be cautious with are the 
hypocrites. Why? Because  the hypocrites claim as our fellow Muslims, 
but they stab us from behind. ….. (The audience was then laughing…).21  
If the so-called ‘infidels’ are non-Muslims, the citation above reaffirms 
what this paper has discussed, i.e., the Muslims have no problem with the 
non-Muslims as long as the latter do not make any trouble with the former. 
The problem to the Muslims is the existence of the ‘hypocrites’, i.e., the ones 
who claim to be fellow Muslims but betray the former. Perhaps one can say 
that the problem between the Muslims and the non-Muslims is potential, 
while the problem between the Muslims and the ‘hypocrites’ is always 
already real, so that it is much more crucial. It is such a crucial problem that 
in another sermon Nik Aziz emphasized that ‘being a hypocrite is being the 
evil par excellence’:  
Don’t be a hypocrite. Why? Because how evil the infidel is, it is much 
more evil to be a hypocrite. Like the Jews. They claimed to be the faithful 
of the Holy Books, but they betrayed  their own prophets, including 
Prophet Isa. 22  
	 			
By the emphasis on ‘not being a hypocrite’, the relation between 
the Muslims and non-Muslims is then secondary.23 However, it does not 
necessarily mean that PAS has put aside this issue. In its official website, 
PAS publishes an article concerning with the position of non-Muslims within 
the Islamic state. It says that non-Muslims living in an Islamic state have a 
number of rights, and the state has the duty to protect their rights. One of 
these rights is to practice their religious beliefs. By this point, one can say 
that there is a religious freedom within Islamic state. However, the state sets 
a number of prohibitions for the non-Muslims. One of these is the banning of 
demonstrating non-Islamic religious symbols in the centers of Islamic City.24
  
21 Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat’s public sermon on Friday,  March 30, 2007.  It is easy to understand 
why the audience were laughing if one knows the context of political rivalry between PAS 
and UMNO. It is the style of Nik Aziz’s rhetoric in his speeches. He never insults particular 
individuals or parties. He only mentions, such as, ‘a group of people have planted a sense 
of hostility’… And, his audience would immediately know whom he means. On Nik Aziz’s 
style of rhetoric, see  Sulaiman (1999: 57-58).   
22 Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat’s public sermon on Friday, April 6, 2007. 
23 Cf. Kessler (1978: 241).  
24 See www.pas.org.my 
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Such normative rules have been a common reference by the Muslims in 
dealing with the non-Muslims. Political activists, either affiliating to UMNO 
or PAS, shared such a perception as well. However, to them this perception 
is based on political calculation rather than on the norm as such. According 
to them non-Muslims in Kelantan are potential supporters to their parties. 
Realizing that the contestation between PAS and UMNO in every election 
is almost always tight, the non-Muslims’ votes can significantly affect the 
result of the elections, where in the final analysis the fate of the government 
could merely depend on the margin of one or two seats.25  However, their 
references are different. To the UMNO activists, their reference is the Federal 
Constitution,26 which states that even though Islam is the religion of the 
Federation, other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part 
of the Federation (The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Article 3 [1]). While 
for the PAS people, their reference is the Qur’an and Hadith, which say that 
‘my faith is what my faith is, your faith is what your faith is’, implying that 
non-Muslims have to be protected within the “Islamic area” (Dar’ul Islam). 
One key word arises in such opinions, i.e., ‘to protect’. If it is a shared 
perception among the Muslims, according to a Muslim feminist Salbiah 
Ahmad (2007: 353), the mindset of Muslims concerning with the non-Muslims 
reflects “the politics of empire”, which sees non-Muslims not as equal citizens, 
but rather as the “protected other”. Protection is thus not the right the non-
Muslims deserve to, but rather as the virtue of the protector. However, due to 
somewhat pragmatism for the sake of their survival, such a point of view is 
not completely adopted by non-Muslims in Kelantan. 
            
3. The ‘no problem’ response according to the non-Muslims
Pragmatism is perhaps the most proper word to feature the ‘psyche’ of the 
non-Muslims in Kelantan. It is a way of seeing things based on practicality, 
in the sense whether a thing works or not. Formerly it was indeed a form of 
compromise, as it has to sacrifice parts of the so-called religious convention. 
However, as pragmatism has been normalized, it has turned to be a ‘new 
convention’. 
In Kelantan, one of the best examples to feature such turn is the non-
Muslims’ adaptation to the PAS’s idea of “Holy Day”. Since PAS took over 
the rule of the state from the National Alliance in 1990, it has determined 
Friday as the ‘Holy Day’, in the sense of praying day, while Saturday as the 
holiday. (It has adopted five work days of the week, i.e., from Sunday to
25 A number of scholars have identified the existence of non-Malays (or non-Muslims) in 
Kelantan as ‘swing voters’, which can significantly determine or affect the result of the 
elections. See, for example, Khoo (2003: 136; 2006: 145), Mohammad Agus Yusoff (2006: 164), 
while Kessler (1978: 241) terms ‘Sino-Malay antagonism as secondary’.  
26 Interview with Cik Gu Mat, a retired secondary school teacher who consistently supported 
UMNO. (April 23, 2007).   
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Thursday, while in other parts of Malaysia, the weekdays are from Monday 
to half-day of Saturday). PAS’ decision to put Friday as the praying day is 
certainly biased of Islamic tradition. Yet, since it is also the best time for non-
Muslims to organize religious gatherings or services, they also adopt Fridays 
as their praying day.  
It is no surprise then that all religious communities hold religious rituals 
or gatherings on Fridays. The Sikhs, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians go 
to their worship places on Fridays.  To the Sikhs, it does not matter to do 
their religious rituals on Fridays since they have no idea of fixed boundaries 
between sacred and profane times. In addition, since on Friday every member 
of the Sikh community is off, then “for the sake of practicality, we organize 
our religious and community gatherings on Friday”.27  
The Hindus and the Buddhists share such a reason as well. Their 
emphasis on what they do on Fridays in the worship places is the communal 
gatherings. While to them religious ritual can be done any time. Therefore, 
they have no objection with the state government’s conditioning of Friday as 
the praying day, even though it is biased of Islamic tradition.28  
While to Christians, it was unusual to join religious services on Fridays 
as it is out of the ‘universal’ convention. In fact, some churches hold services 
on both Friday and Sunday.29 Yet, the local congregates tend to join the Friday 
morning services, while Sunday services – held in the evening – are attended 
mostly by expatriates. However, there might be something ‘odd’ to the non-
local Christians firstly coming to Kelantan, as the so-called Sunday school 
for Christian children is held on Fridays. It sounds inconsistent between the 
name of the program and the time the program is carried out. However, to 
them it does not matter as long as the program works.30       
Due to the absence of religious conflict and a sense of mutual threat, 
one can likely say that there is indeed a religious tolerance in Kelantan.31 Yet, 
it is a tolerance or interreligious harmony in a minimal sense. Perhaps this 
level of tolerance will never develop into the stage of mutual understanding 
27 Interview with Mr. Harbindar Jeet Singh, April 5, 2007. 
28 Interview with Mr. Khoo, April 7, 2007; and with Mdm. Selvi, April 8, 2007.  
29 In Kota Bharu there are eight churches of different denominations. Only two of them are 
landed buildings, while the rest are in shop lots. It indicates how small the number of the 
congregate is. To my personal observation, the largest number of attendances is fifty people, 
as happened to the St. Martin’s Anglican Church in the Easter Day service. The churches 
in the shop lots like the Latter Rain Church, Bible Church, Methodist, etc. are attended by 
around fifteen to twenty five people.    
30 Interview with Pastor Reuben Daniel – the minister of St. Martin’s Anglican Church of Kota 
Bharu – on April 14, 2007. 
31 A number of informants, both Muslims and non-Muslims, claimed that since PAS ruled 
Kelantan in 1990, there has been no demolition of non-Muslim worship places. They 
were proud of telling this as they know that such cases often happen in the other states of 
Malaysia, and the very victims are always the non-Muslims. In Kota Bharu, there was a case 
in early 1990s where a Sikh worship place had to relocate to another place, since the state 
government wanted to use the site for a government building. The Sikh community did not 
have any objection because the state government helped the relocation. (Interview with Mr. 
Harbindar Jeet Singh, April 5, 2007).  
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as a prerequisite of inter-religious collaborations for common concerns. 
The obstacle to achieving such a level of interreligious harmony is a spatial 
segregation between the Muslims and non-Muslims. Demarcations in 
physical and in psychological terms are clearly drawn. It is hardly possible 
to find residential areas inhabited by people of different faiths, in the sense of 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims (Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs, and 
Hindus) can reside in the same neighborhood, but it is impossible to them to 
have Muslim neighbors, and it is also impossible to the Muslims to have non-
Muslim neighbors. 
Due to a spatial segregation there is a lack of interaction between the 
Muslims and the non-Muslims in the everyday life. To some degree, this has 
made the non-Muslims feel socially ‘floated’. They are not convinced whether 
they have been completely accepted as parts of Kelantanese. They feel neither 
welcomed nor expelled. They feel that they can live there, not because they 
have the right to be there, but because the Muslims by law cannot expel 
them.32
Closing remarks
Regardless of having enough freedom to do their religious practices under the 
PAS’ rule, non-Muslims in Kelantan still have some anxiety that if the PAS’ 
idea of Islamic state – where all government regulations refer to the Qur’an 
and Hadits – is completely  implemented, they are not entirely convinced 
how their future would be (cf. Khoo, 2003: 141). They feel that the freedom 
they have enjoyed is not taken for granted, but rather as a result of the political 
contestation between PAS and UMNO. 
To the non-Muslims, UMNO is perceived as the guardian of the Federal 
Constitution, in which it is stated that Malaysia is not and will never be an 
Islamic State, although Islam is put on the top priority. There is a guarantee 
on the religious freedom. While from the PAS, the non-Muslims have got 
some guarantee that they are not supposed to follow the Islamic law once the 
Islamic state is established. 
Consequently, the non-Muslims tend to vote for UMNO for the Federal 
Parliament, and to vote for PAS for the State Council. (At least it was what 
they did – as some non-Muslim informants admitted – in the 2004 General 
Election). By such political preference they expect that the political status quo 
remains there, meaning that the PAS’ rule over Kelantan is not disrupted – as it 
has been historically rooted there – but its ambition for establishing an Islamic 
state is hanging, for UMNO – as the guardian of the Federal Constitution 
– will always hinder it. 
32 Interview with Mr. Harbindar Jeet Singh and Mr. Daljit Singh, April 5, 2007;  interview with 
Mr. Khoo, April 7, 2007. 
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Due to such a calculation, the re-branding of Kota Bharu as an 
“Islamic City” in late 2005 – by which Islamic slogans and symbols are 
presented everywhere – has no psychological effect to the non-Muslims. The 
omnipresence of “Islam” does not make an “Islamophobia” among the non-
Muslims. They realize that such re-“Islam”-ization of the public space and 
place is only a responsive measure to the UMNO’s proclamation of “Islam 
Hadhari”.   
Being a minority then does not necessarily mean being the oppressed 
nor the oppressor, nor completely integrated with the majority. The case of 
non-Muslim minorities in Kelantan is unique as it cannot be explained by the 
patterns of majority – minority relation as such. It can only be explained by its 
particular historical contexts. 
The non-Muslims living in the “Veranda of Mecca” do indeed not 
necessarily feel worried of being threatened by “Islam” and the “Islamization” 
of public life. Yet, they are and will never be completely integrated into the 
local community. A sense of being perceived as ‘half-visitor’, regardless of 
living there for generations, is predominant among them. Coexist does not 
necessarily mean cohabit, as the latter requires some emotional bound. l     
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